Communism East Europe

 
TITLE: Why did communism collapse in Eastern Europe? 
 
SUBJECT: European Studies B 
EDUCATION: First year university 
GRADE: first honour 
AUTHOR'S COMMENTS: I liked it. Interested to hear other people's 
comments. 
TUTOR'S COMMENTS: Well done!! Extremely informative. Well 
researched. Good Layout. Stress Gorbachev's role more. 
 
 Communism is like Prohibition - its a good idea but it wont 
work 
                       (Will Rogers, 1927) (1) 
 
This essay will give a brief introduction to communism. It will 
then discuss the various factors which combined to bring about 
the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. It will examine each 
of these factors and evaluate the effect of each. Finally it will 
attempt to assertain whether Rogers opinion (see above  
quotation) on Communism is true, that is, whether communism was 
truly doomed to fail from the start, or whether its collapse  
was a result of external influences. 
 
Communism is based on the ideas and teachings of Karl Marx as 
modified by Lenin. At its most basic, the ideal of communism is a 
system in which everyone is seen as equal and wealth is 
distributed equally among the people. There is no private 
ownership. The state owns and controls all enterprises and 
property. The state is run by one leading elite. The Soviet model 
of communism was based on these ideals. All opposition parties  
were banned although parties who were sympathetic to communism 
and who shared the communist ideals were allowed. All power was 
concentrated into the hands of the Communist party. Free press 
and civil liberties were suppressed. Censorship and  
propaganda were widely used. There was state ownership of the 
economy. No private enterprise was allowed. There was a 
collectivisation of agriculture. The Communist Party invaded and 
controlled every aspect of political, social, cultural and 
economic life. It was a totalitarian state with complete 
Communist control over all facets of life. In the early years, 
and up until Gorbachevs new regime, the use of force and 
terror as a means of maintaining control was widespread.  
 
The first factor which contributed to the failure and eventual 
collapse of communism was the fact that the Communist partys 
domination was illegitimate from the beginning. Lenin came to 
power after a bloody Civil  War between those who supported  
Lenin and those who opposed the Soviet regime. To Lenin, defeat 
was unthinkable and he was prepared to make any and every 
sacrifice to win the war and save the revolution. The forcible 
requisitioning of food and supplies was approved by Lenin.  
This could only be achieved by enforcing strict and absolute 
discipline at every level of society. Terror was to become the 
chief instrument of power and Lenin was to assume the role of 
dictator. This was a phenomenon which was to become a symbol of  
communist regimes throughout their lifetime. 
 
This trend was followed when Stalin came to power as leader of 
the Communist party and the Russian government in 1929. (2) He 
had achieved this through plotting and trickery and by shifting 
alliances. This had begun in 1924 when Stalin systematically  
began to remove all opposition to his claim to power. His main 
rival was Trotsky and he used a number of underhand measures to 
discredit him. For example Stalin lied to Trotsky about the date 
of Lenins funeral, thus ensuring that Trotsky could not attend  
and thereby blackening his name in the public eye. This Stalin 
versus Trotsky conflict led to Trotsky being eventually exiled 
from Russia and, ten years later in 1940, being assassinated by 
one of Stalins agents. (3) 
 
Under Stalin any opposition was swiftly and brutally crushed. In 
no Eastern European country did the revolution have the support 
of more than a minority of people, yet this minority retained 
absolute control. The communist take-over and subsequent regime  
was achieved by undemocratic methods, that is, rigged elections, 
terror, totalitarian state, harassment and threats.  In 1932 a 
two-hundred page document by a fellow member of the Politburo 
condemning the Stalinist regime and calling for change was 
published. (4) In response to this Stalin wreaked a terrible 
revenge. In 1936 Stalin began what became known as the purges 
whose function it was to try members of the communist party who 
had acted treasonously. (5) The result of these was that five  
thousand party members were arrested and stripped of their 
membership. The sixteen defendants in the three Showtrials of 
1936, 1937 and 1938 were found guilty and executed. In 1939 those 
who had conducted the purges were also executed. By 1939 the  
only member of Lenins original Politburo who remained, was 
Stalin himself. (6) 
 
In relation to foreign policy, Stalin exerted his influence to 
ensure that all Eastern European countries (except Yugoslavia) 
had Soviet-imposed puppet regimes. Stalins domination was now 
total. After the war Stalin succeeded in establishing a communist  
buffer zone between Russia and Western Europe. Any resistance he 
met in establishing communist states was quickly suppressed by 
intimidation and terror. For example Stalin engineered a 
communist coup in May 1948 in Czechoslovakia in which a 
government minister Masaryk was killed and the president was 
forced to resign. (7)  This served a warning to other countries 
against resisting the communist regime. 
 
Therefore it can clearly be seen that from the establishment of 
the state that communism never had popular public support. It 
cannot be denied that there was a significant minority who 
supported communism, but these were a minority. Can an ideal and 
a leadership really be built on such a shallow and flimsy basis? 
This essay would argue that the answer to this question is no. 
For a leadership to lead, it must have strong support and 
confidence. It must be seen to work for the good of the people 
and not merely a vociferous minority. This, therefore, can be 
argued to be one of the contributing factors in the downfall of 
communism.  
 
A second related factor, which had a hand in bringing about the 
end of communism in Eastern Europe was the fact that communism 
never really had the support of the people. There was constant 
societal opposition to communist rule in Eastern Europe. Although  
this was mainly in the form of a passive rumbling dissent, there 
were occasional violent and active shows of opposition to 
communist rule. The states of Eastern Europe in the post-war 
period had been forced to adhere to the Moscow line. After 1956 
however, with Khrushchevs new approach to Socialism and his 
denunciation of Stalin, there were increasing calls for 
independence among the communist bloc countries who had  
never been truly supportive of the communist regime. 
 
In East Germany in 1953 there were a series of strikes and 
protests. (8) The Russians, under Stalin, used their armed forces 
to put down the revolt and to protect East Germanys communist 
government. This shows the importance of Soviet military force  
in maintaining communisms tenuous grip on power. It also shows 
how weak communist rule in East Germany really was, It was this 
event that sealed East Germanys fate as the USSR realised that 
in a united Germany, the Communists would lose control. Events 
eventually culminated with the building of the Berlin Wall which 
was the ultimate expression of Soviet and communist force and 
coercion in maintaining the communist regime. 
 
Under Khrushchev, who had succeeded Stalin after his death in 
1953, Poland was the first to revolt against the communist 
regime. Polish workers rioted and went on strike in 1956 and the 
Polish communist party also revolted by refusing to accept the 
Russian general Rokossovsky as the Polish Minister for Defence. 
(9) The situation was diffused by a compromise which was made on 
both sides, with Poland agreeing to remain in the communist 
Eastern bloc if the nationalist communist leader Gomulka, who had 
been imprisoned by Stalin, was reinstated. The fact that 
Khrushchev was willing to compromise illustrates again the 
precarious position of communist rule. 
 
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was borne out of the relative 
success of the Poles in achieving concessions for the Moscow 
leadership. (10) The Hungarians decided to overthrow the 
Stalinist regime in their country. The situation quickly 
deteriorated and on the 23rd of October the Hungarian troops, who 
had been dispatched to end the riots, joined the civilians in 
revolution. Soviet troops were called in and the Hungarian  
communist party lost the little support which they had. Again 
Khrushchev tried to diffuse the situation by offering a 
compromise, that is, the reinstatement of the moderate  
communist leader Nagy. When it became clear, however, that Nagy 
had every intention of pulling out of the Soviet communist bloc, 
Khrushchev resorted to force and violence to maintain the 
communist grip on Hungary. He ordered the return of Soviet tanks 
and troops to Budapest on November 4th 1956. (11) Thousands were 
killed in a bloody street battle until the Soviets had re-
established their control. Nagy was arrested and was executed two 
years later. A Soviet imposed communist regime under Janos Kadar 
was set up. (12) The tenuous communist grip on control is again 
illustrated here. Khrushchev was willing to barter, and 
eventually use force, to maintain Soviet control. Without this  
force and coercion, however, Hungary would have established its 
own brand of communist rule. Khrushchev could not risk the domino 
effect that this action would have had on the Eastern bloc. This 
societal opposition can, therefore, be taken to be another 
contributing factor in the downfall of communist rule in the 
Eastern bloc. If those in the alliance cannot cooperate and work 
together, the alliance and the ideal cannot hope to survive. 
 
Another important factor which this essay will discuss is that of 
the influence of the West on the Eastern bloc. The Eastern bloc 
was already aware of Western capitalist success as they were 
allies during the war. Many of the Eastern countries, for example 
Hungary under Nagy or Czechoslovakia under Dubcek, were in favour 
of a communist system with some elements of capitalism, that is, 
a mixed economy or market socialism and more elements of 
democracy. There had been a breakdown in relations between the  
East and West due to tensions after WWII. After the war Russia 
wanted to create a sphere of influence in the East over which the 
West would have no say or control. This was not acceptable to the 
West who wanted to see democracy installed in the East and  
who wanted to have a continued input into the doings of the East. 
This conflict ventually led to the Cold War. 
 
 Until Khrushchev became leader of the Soviet bloc, there had 
been no significant contact between the two blocs. Those inside 
of the Soviet bloc were completely cut off from the Western 
ideals. When Khrushchev came to power, however, there as renewed  
hope in the West that there might be a thaw in relations 
between the two blocs. Relations between the two blocs did 
improve with Khrushchev attending a number of conferences and 
meetings. For example a twelve-day visit to the US in 1959, a UN  
General Assembly, also in 1959 and a later UN General Assembly 
meeting in 1960 in the US. (13) Although then relations began to 
break down again due to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the Eastern bloc became  
cut off once more, western ideas had already managed to penetrate 
the East. (14) The information that the capitalist West was 
thriving while the Communist Eastern bloc was stagnating and 
underdeveloped, made communism and Soviet control even more  
unpopular. 
 
In 1963 there again was an easing of tensions between the two 
blocs when Russia and the US signed a test ban treaty which 
allowed the Wests influence to again creep into the East. (15) 
In 1964 Khrushchev was ousted from power and Brezhnev with 
Kosygin took over from him. (16) In 1966 the US and USSR agreed 
to a direct air service between Moscow and New York. In 1967 
they, along with 60 other countries, signed the first 
international treaty providing for the peaceful exploration of 
outer space. (17) In the 1970s a period of D_tente began. In 
1970 West Germany and Poland signed a treaty rejecting the use of 
force. West Germany and Russia ratified a similar treaty in 1972. 
(18) In 1972 Nixon and Brezhnev signed the SALT I treaty which 
was to limit the production of US and Russian nuclear weapons.  
In 1973 East and West Germany joined the UN. (19)  Throughout 
this period the West had more and more access to the Eastern bloc 
and the people of the communist countries were influenced by 
these ideas. This was a further blow to communist rule and 
another factor in the downfall of communism. 
 
The next contributing factor to the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe was that of its economic failure. During the years 
of war communism from 1918-1921, Soviet labourers worked for 
pittance wages. At the same time the Bolshevik confiscated  
virtually all harvests. This brought the country to the brink of 
economic collapse. The net result of war communism under Lenin 
was that from 1914 the countryside was neglected and destroyed 
and in 1920 there was a severe drought. (20) In 1921 the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced. This was in effect a 
limited capitalism. Peasants were allowed to keep their surpluses 
after taxes were paid. Bonuses, extra rations and better  
housing were offered as incentives. Still there was widespread 
opposition to the communist policy with the beginnings of a 
peasant war against Stalins proposed collectivisation policy 
in 1928. (21) Although agricultural production increased, the  
standard of living was lowered and hardship was widespread. 
Forcible collectivisation was pursued until 1935. This again 
shows the peoples general opposition to communist policies. 
Collectivisation failed to meet agricultural requirements during  
WWII. The human cost of the policy was staggering. If the people 
are suffering under a particular regime they will not support it, 
how then can this regime hope to survive? 
 
When Khrushchev came to power, he too failed to salvage the 
economy. Although some of the policies which he introduced in the 
1950s had an initial success, they soon collapsed with 
disastrous effects. Figures for meat in 1958 were artificially 
high but collapsed soon after. In 1962 there were sharp increases 
in the prices of butter and meat. (22) Food riots were forcibly 
quelled by the shooting of seventy unarmed demonstrators in 1962. 
(23) Industry was not faring any better and by 1963 production  
levels had declined sharply in every branch of industry. As 
Khrushchev himself said of communism in 1958:-  If, after forty 
years of communism, a person cannot have a glass of milk and  a 
pair of shoes, he will not believe that communism is a good 
thing (24) 
 
Under Brezhnev the economic state of the USSR continued to 
decline. Support for communism was falling and due to improved 
relations with the West, the people could see how disadvantaged 
they were. Under Andropov who succeeded Brezhnev in 1982  
the situation did not improve. Change began only when Gorbachev 
came to power in 1985. (25) The major problems in the economy 
which Gorbachev had to deal with were, the wasteful use of 
resources, the lack of innovation, a poor division of labour, too 
many costly products being produced, ineffective use of resources 
and low productivity. There was a resistance to technological 
innovation due to a lack of incentives. Wages were low and the 
mechanisms involved in introducing a new idea or practice were 
time-consuming and complicated. There was a general inflexibility 
in the enterprise network which also stifled innovation. There 
was also a lack of investment in new ideas and industry. 
Gorbachevs solution to these problems was a Perestroika of the 
economy. 
 
The challenge of Perestroika was to move to more intensive 
methods of production and more effective use of inputs. His 
economic polices began with the promise of a revival of  
some of the practices of NEP. His aim was to cause output to 
double by the year 2000 and for production and productivity to 
rise substantially. It was not until 1987, however, that these 
ideas were put into a concrete plan. (26) A vigorous anti-alcohol 
campaign was initiated. Vineyards were destroyed and beer 
production was cut-back. By 1988, however, they had to admit that 
this policy was a complete failure and it was abandoned in 1990. 
(27) By 1985 the USSR had a budget deficit of R37 billion. (28) 
Due to miscalculations in relation to the extent of the budget 
deficit, Gorbachev authorised spending in social and investment 
sectors while maintaining the spending in the military sector. 
This was a gross mistake which resulted in the budget deficit in 
1989 having increased to R100 billion or 11% of the Gross 
National Product (GNP) and was predicted to rise to R120 billion. 
Therefore, under Gorbachev, the budget deficit rose from 3% in  
1985 to 14% in 1989. (29) Inflation increased to over 5%. (30) 
Prices failed to reflect the high cost of production and many 
companies were working at a loss. This economic failure of 
communism meant that support for the system fell and that it was 
becoming increasingly more difficult for the communist party to 
convince the people that this indeed was the way forward, and a 
better solution than capitalism. 
 
Gorbachev therefore aimed to tie salaries into achieved results 
and to remove subsidies on some goods and services. He did not 
act immediately, however, with his price reform package as he 
hoped to first achieve a balance between supply and demand. This  
merely worsened matters and wages continued to rise faster than 
output and productivity. The main failure of Perestroika is that 
it didnt remove the old price system. Instead, it allowed the 
old price system, which was based on scarcity, to continue, and 
this merely exacerbated shortages. Ironically, it was the mass  
organisations of people, who had emerged to defend living 
standards, who actually hampered the struggle against inflation 
and the budget deficit. This situation was partly created by the 
fact that the governing party had no popular support and  
hadnt been popularly elected. The economic situation continued 
to decline. There was a zero growth rate. Shops were calculated 
to be lacking 243 out 276 basic consumer items and there was a 
chronic shortage of 1000 items out of 1200 which would be on a 
model shopping list. There was a static farm output and high 
levels of inflation. (31) Therefore it can be seen that communism 
was an economic disaster. Khrushchevs remark again can be used 
to illustrate the effect which this had on the support for 
communism. (see ref 24).   
 
As previously mentioned, communism never had majority support or 
a legitimate political basis. Force and coercion were regularly 
used to ensure that the communist party remained in power. 
Therefore one can maintain that the fact that communism was  
a political failure was also a contributing factor to the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. If a party has not got 
the support of a majority, then it has a weak political basis.  
The fact that undemocratic means were used to ensure that the 
communists came to, and then maintained, power shows that 
communism was a political failure. Throughout the history of 
communism in Russia, never once did the party gain a majority 
support or truly succeed in suppressing public demonstrations of 
antipathy towards communism. It can therefore be argued that a 
political leadership with no political basis or support  
could ever hope to survive. 
 
Another important factor to note is communisms utter failure in 
relation to society and culture. Soviet society under Communist 
rule was socially and culturally underdeveloped. The state had a 
say in every aspect of societal life. In response to low  
birth rates, large numbers of orphans and the failure of 37/100 
marriages in 1934 alone, the communist leadership compelled the 
media to promote stable family life. (32) Propaganda was used to 
coerce the people into believing in the positive virtues of  
marriage and children. Divorce was made more difficult and 
abortion was prohibited. Thus the peoples right to choose and 
exert control over their own personal and familial decisions was 
removed. In schools, the teaching of the social sciences was  
curtailed and Marxist and Leninist theories were expounded.  In 
the late thirties fees were reintroduced for the three upper 
forms of secondary school. This effectively meant that only those 
who could afford to pay these fees could send their children on 
to further academic training as these were the forms which 
prepared children for higher education. (33) Under Stalin 
topographical, economic and political information and affairs 
were a state secret. Maps were inaccurate and details about past 
disasters and history were omitted or embellished. 
 
Propaganda and brainwashing was used to ensure that the virtues 
of communism were extolled and a cult following was created 
around Lenin and Stalin. A Short Course on the History of the 
CPSU became the staple intellectual diet of all schoolchildren. 
(34) This was a propagandistic book based on an idealistic view 
of communism and its leaders. The mass arrests, the truth of the 
purges and the labour camps were not allowed to be discussed in 
the media. State monopoly of information and mass communications 
deployed in this way, and backed by the use of coercion and 
force and the military, degraded the nations intellectual and 
cultural life. People were simply not allowed to form an opinion 
contrary to that of the communist state. People were also not 
allowed to choose their own religion or follow their own personal 
religious beliefs. The state outlawed and censored religious 
propaganda and publications. The Soviet state actively and 
brutally persecuted the churches. A large number of these  
were desecrated or destroyed. More than half of all monasteries 
were forced to close and in 1921 twenty-eight bishops were 
arrested or died in violent clashes with the Soviet military. 
(35) Attempts were also made to split the church from the inside. 
By 1939 only 12 bishops, out of the 163 who had been active in 
1930, remained. (36) These repressive measures, as a whole, meant 
that the growth of Soviet culture and society was stunted and 
stagnating. The secrecy and lies undermined efficiency, isolated  
individuals and eroded the morale of society. This was compounded 
by the fact that, due to Western influences, the public in the 
communist countries were beginning to realise their predicament 
and their backwardness. These measures continued until Gorbachev 
came to power. 
 
This point leads onto the most important factor which contributed 
to the eventual collapse of communism in the East, that is, 
Gorbachev. Without Gorbachev it is doubtful that the 
disintegration of the communist regime would have occurred so 
soon. Gorbachev can be seen as a reform communist. He introduced 
a number of revolutionary reforms like Perestroika and Glasnost. 
The combined effect of these policies, and his general attitude 
to reform, communism and the USSR, had the effect of causing the 
culmination of all opposition to communism and collapsing the 
system. 
 
Glasnost proved to be a great relief valve which allowed the 
people to voice their long-standing discontent about communism 
and the communist regime as a whole. The positive elements of 
Glasnost had the effect of bringing national tensions to the 
surface of political and social life and, in a sense, 
exacerbating the national problem.  Liberalisation made people 
less afraid of retribution when they spoke out against the  
injustices of the system and the atrocities which had occurred. 
The ripple effect of Gorbachevs radical Perestroika and Glasnost 
weakened the authority of thecommunist governments - 
economically, socially and ideologically.  Above all the failure  
of communism lay in the failure of Gorbachevs Perestroika. If 
the economy had improved then so too would the peoples well-
being and they may have considered maintaining the communist 
regime. 
  
The fundamental problem with Perestroika was how to change a 
system which had been built to withstand change. It was 
increasingly fractured. It had originally been based on  
inaccurate figures about the well-being of the economy and the 
national debt. Life under Perestroika became even harder for the 
majority of Soviet people. There were no state-employed social 
groups or skilled workers who stood to gain from Perestroika in 
the short term. Economic reform involved hard work and higher 
prices and therefore Perestroika was short on support. As the 
economic situation worsened, sotoo did the peoples support for 
communism fall. This time there was a difference however. Due to 
Glasnost the people and the media were now free to criticise the 
policy. 
 
Glasnost had the effect of ensuring that the previous reign of 
terror which the communist leadership had held, was brought to an 
end. Gorbachev employed a policy of Glasnost, that is, openness 
and the right to criticise and express an opinion. Up until  
then Soviet society was closed. No criticism or freedom of speech 
was allowed. The major feature of Glasnost is that of the lifting 
of most of the restrictions which had beenimposed on the 
circulation of information since communism began. The blank pages 
in history were about to be filled in. Gorbachev realised that 
the former policy of absolute secrecy was a major force holding 
back the development of society. Censorship was relaxed. This had 
the adverse effect of allowing the public criticism of a regime 
which previously could not be criticised. 
 
Gorbachev also allowed increasing independence to the Eastern 
bloc states. He had come to the conclusion that compelling an 
unwilling population to live under a system they detested was not 
ensuring the USSRs security, but on the contrary, jeopardising  
it.  He indicated by omission, rather than by direct statement, 
that he would not obstruct a change which would result in these 
states achieving a measure of independence. 
 
In Czechoslovakia on the 18th of January 1989 there was a 
decision taken to legalise Solidarity. (37) On the 10th of 
February the Hungarian communists agreed to a multi-party system 
and there was no opposition to this on the part of the Soviets. 
On 29th March Moscow told the Hungarians that they would not 
interfere in East European affairs. (38) In Poland on January 
18th, Solidarity had been legalised after a string of protests 
and riots in Hungary. (39) This led to an agreement between the 
communist government and Solidarity, the main focus of which was 
the holding of the first relatively free elections since the 
1940s in Poland. The elections were devastating to the  
communists. They were swept out of the Senate and did not have 
any representatives elected to the Sejm until the second round of 
counting. (40) 
 
This had a domino effect and hastened events elsewhere. Far from 
Gorbachevs original hope that allowing the Eastern states more 
freedom would bring the union closer together, it was tearing the 
union apart. Kadar was ousted from Hungary and the communists 
were swept aside by the Hungarian Democratic Forum. On September 
11th Hungary opened its borders with Austria and allowed 
thousands of East Germans to cross to the west. (41) The people 
of East Germany were demanding Glasnost and Perestroika. On 
October 9th a mass demonstration of 70,000 people occurred in 
Leipzig. (42) Thousands of Germans were escaping to the west 
through Hungary and the GDR was powerless to stop them. Honecker, 
the East German leader, buckled under the pressure and resigned. 
The net effect of which was that his successors allowed the  
opening of the Berlin Wall on 8th November 1989 after the East 
German government and communist leadership resigned. (43) 
 
On the 24th of November the Czechoslovak Communist Party resigned 
after mass demonstrations in Prague of up to 800,000 people. On 
the 7th of December the communist government in Czechoslovakia 
collapsed entirely and a new non-communist government was formed. 
(44) 
  
Gorbachevss reforms were wreaking havoc on the communist system. 
Its base, already weak and fragile, began to crumble away under 
the massive wave of anti-communist feeling which had finally come 
to the fore after years of suppression. On the 11th of December 
Bulgarian communists were forced to agree to a multi-party system  
and on the 25th, the Rumanian leader Ceausescu and his wife were 
tried and executed. (45) All of this was borne out of Gorbachevs 
reforms. The communist regime had been built on force and 
coercion, terror and undemocratic methods. This regime could  
therefore not be expected to survive under such an onslaught. In 
refusing the Eastern bloc communist parties aid to suppress the 
revolts within, Gorbachev effectively sealed their fate. The 
communist parties in those countries had always relied on Soviet 
force for support in maintaining control of the countries, now 
that his support had been removed the regimes crumbled. Therefore 
the significance of the Gorbachev factor cannot be denied when 
discussing the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe. If 
Gorbachev had not introduced his reforms or had not refused aid 
to the other Eastern bloc communist parties, the communist regime 
may have still stood today. Gorbachev may not have been the cause 
of the downfall, but he was certainly the trigger. The situation  
was like a fuse, Gorbachev merely provided the matches and 
refused to stop the fire. 
 
The final factor which this essay will examine, is that of the 
loss of elite party confidence.  With his reforms Gorbachev had 
undermined the morale and confidence of the party elite. It had 
become clear that the communist cause had exhausted itself and  
was a failure. Their utopian hopes had been torn apart one by one 
throughout the years and Gorbachev had made them face this fact. 
This had a paralysing effect on them and led to their apathy 
about the ending of communism. If they had believed that there 
was something left to fight for they may have used physical force 
to overthrow Gorbachev and suppress the revolts, but they did 
not. Gorbachev had launched a step-by-step dismantling of the 
party and the nomenklatura under Perestroika. He separated and  
neutralised his most militant opponents among the conservative 
members of the party elite. At the 28th Congress the party elite 
was divided between those who would monitor the development of 
Glasnost and perestroika, and the Presidency who would champion  
the fight against the unreformable members of the nomenklatura. 
(46) Until the 28th Congress membership of the nomenklatura had 
been a ticket to wealth and power, after the conference it became 
a mere shell. Membership fell off and loyalties faded. A form  
of local government control was implemented by Gorbachev to 
further diminish the role of the Politburo. Piece by piece 
Gorbachev was chipping away at the old elites confidence and 
beliefs. The fact that Gorbachev was gaining support both from 
the public at home and abroad, further eroded their confidence. 
 
When the USSR began to collapse, however, certain voices in the 
party refused to allow Gorbachev dismantle more of their dreams. 
Yelstin was emerging at this time as an opponent to Gorbachevs 
rule. In response Gorbachev banned a pro-Yelstin rally in  
Moscow in 1991. (47) Alarmed at a series of political strikes and 
a growing support for Yelstin, Gorbachev negotiated a compromise 
which stipulated that in return for an end to political strikes, 
Gorbachev would negotiate a new Union treaty which would give 
power to the republics. The day before this treaty was to be 
signed, however, its  opponents moved to forestall it. Pugo 
announced that he was assuming presidential control as Gorbachev 
was ill and declared a state of emergency. (48) Gorbachev  
refused to concur with this announcement. Yelstin called for a 
general strike and said that the emergency government was 
unconstitutional. (49) Some workers went on strike, more did 
not. Battle lines were being drawn and the complete collapse of  
communism was not far behind. The leaders of the coup were 
arrested by Gorbachevs men and Gorbachev returned to Moscow. 
 
The failed coup ironically however, had precipitated the process 
it had been trying to prevent, that is, the break up of the USSR 
and the demise of the communist party. In the Russian parliament 
Yelstin signed a decree suspending the communist party pending  
an investigation of the coup. Gorbachev had triumphed over the 
plotters but now had to capitulate to Yelstin. After a vain 
attempt at protest, Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of 
the CPSU and recommended that the General Committee should 
disband itself. In June 1991 Yelstin was elected president of 
Russia. (50) After the failure of the coup most of the Soviet 
republics declared their independence and sovereignty.  
Gorbachev tried unsuccessfully to revive the Union treaty for 
several months afterwards, but to no avail. The chain of events 
had been set in motion and could not be stopped now. 
 
On the 8th of December 1991 Yelstin, along with the Beloruissian 
and Ukraine leaders issued a statement which declared the end of 
the USSR. They offered a Commonwealth of Independent States in 
return and invited other countries to join. (51) Gorbachev  
protested at first but then bowed to the inevitable. Communism in 
Eastern Europe had collapsed. On the 25th of December 1991, he 
tendered his resignation as president of the USSR and the 
communist flag was lowered from the Kremlin dome to be replaced 
by the Russian tricolour. (52) 
 
Communism in Eastern Europe, therefore, collapsed for a number of 
reasons. It had no political basis or popular support. It was 
riddled with economic problems and, in comparison to capitalism, 
was a complete failure.  Finally the Gorbachev factor and the  
loss of elitist party confidence fanned the flames and destroyed 
communism. Communism broke down because of fatal weaknesses built 
into the system from its inception. It is in a humans nature to 
aim for success and prosperity. Communism denies the competitive 
trait which is inherent in all humans. Communism was rejected  
because it is not as good as alternative systems of satisfying 
humans material wants. Communism also is at odds with the other 
most basic instinct which a human has, that is, the desire for 
freedom. Communism, in practice, denied the expression of civil 
liberties, opinions and thought. It was also a forced rule which 
was only enforced by terror, not acceptance or majority ruling. 
Such a regime could only hope to last for a certain period,  
never indefinitely. Gorbachevs reforms were merely the catalyst 
for this failure. Gorbachev wished to reform the system, not 
destroy it, but the situation rapidly went out of control as 
years of pent-up frustration and  antipathy toward the communist 
regime was finally given expression. 
 
Can we therefore validate the quotation by Rogers which was made 
at the start of this essay? This essay would argue yes. A regime 
which is inherently against human nature can never hope to 
succeed. It is human to want what we cannot have and to be denied 
it, as with prohibition, makes us all the more determined and 
curious to achieve that which is forbidden. The same can be said 
to be true for communism. Therefore this essay would conclude 
that although there were a number of external contributory 
influence to the collapse of communism, communism as an ideal 
cannot hope to survive for long in anything more than a 
theoretical sense, as it is inherently contrary to the basic 
drives of human nature. 
 
    FOOTNOTES 
 
(1) Various Inputs, Chronicle of the 20th Century Quotations 
(Guinness Publishing  Ltd., 1996)   page 36 
 
(2) Various Inputs, World Book Encyclopaedias (World Book Inc., 
1984)  page 727 
 
(3) Kehoe, A.M, Makers of 20th Century Europe (Mentor 
Publications Ltd., 1988)   page 25 
 
(4) Ibid., page 32 
 
(5) Ibid. 
 
(6) Ibid., page 33 
 
(7) Ibid., page 40 
 
(8) O Brien, Eileen, Modern Europe 1870-1966  (Mentor 
Publications Ltd., 1995)   page 231 
 
(9) Kehoe, A.M, op cit., page 50 
 
(10) Ibid. 
 
(11) Ibid. 
 
(12) Ibid. 
 
(13) Ibid., page 52 
 
(14) Ibid. 
 
(15) Various Inputs, op cit. (1984)  page 618b 
 
(16) Ibid., page 618a 
 
(17) Ibid., page 618b 
 
(18) Ibid. 
 
(19) Ibid. 
 
(20) Kehoe, A.M, op cit.  page 13 
 
(21) Ibid. 
 
(22) Ibid., page 55 
 
(23) Ibid. 
 
(24) Various Inputs, op cit. (1996)  page 142 
 
(25) Sakwa, Richard,Gorbachev and his Reforms 1985-1990 (Philip 
Allan, 1990)   page 271 
 
(26) Ibid. 
 
(27) Ibid., page 272 
 
(28) Ibid. 
 
(29) Ibid. 
 
(30) Ibid. 
 
(31) Ibid., page 281 
 
(32) Hosking, Geoffrey,  A History of the Soviet Union  (Fontana 
Press, 1992)  page  213 
 
(33) Ibid., page 215 
 
(34) Ibid., page 218 
 
(35) Ibid., page 228 
 
(36) Ibid., page 235 
 
(37) Ibid., page 245 
 
(38) Ibid. 
 
(39) Ibid. 
 
(40) Ibid. 
 
(41) Ibid., page 466 
 
(42) Ibid. 
 
(43) Ibid. 
 
(44) Ibid. 
 
(45) Ibid., page 468 
 
(46) Novikov, Euvgeny & Bascio, Patrick, Gorbachev and the 
Collapse of the Soviet  Communist Party  (Peter Lang Publishing 
Inc., 1994)  page 68 
 
(47) Hosking, Geoffrey, op cit.  page 494 
 
(48) Ibid., page 495 
 
(49) Ibid. 
 
(50) Ibid., page 497 
 
(51) Ibid., page 498 
 
(52) Ibid. 
 
           BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Brown, Archie,  The Gorbachev Factor  (Oxford University Press, 
1996) 
 
Hosking, Geoffrey,   A History of the Soviet Union  (Fontana 
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Kehoe, A.M,   Makers of 20th Century Europe  (Mentor Publications 
Ltd., 1988) 
 
Miller, R.F & Miller, J.H & Rigby, T.H,  Gorbachev at the Helm  
(Croom Helm, 1987) 
 
Novikov, Euvgeny & Bascio, Patrick, Gorbachev and the Collapse of 
the Soviet Communist Party  (Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1994) 
 
O Brien, Eileen, Modern Europe 1870-1966  (Mentor Publications 
Ltd., 1995) 
 
Sakwa, Richard,  Gorbachev and his Reforms 1985-1990  (Philip 
Allan, 1990) 
 
Swain, Geoffrey & Swain, Nigel,  Eastern Europe Since 1945  (St. 
Martins Press Inc., 1993) 
 
Various Inputs, Chronicle of the 20th Century Quotations  
(Guinness Publishing  Ltd., 1996) Various Inputs, World Book 
Encyclopaedias (World Book Inc., 1984) 
 
  Word Count: 5774 